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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court granted certiorari in connection with the opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals in Gillmor v. Family Link LLC, 2010 UT App 2, 224 P.3d 741, and has
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This action is the third in a series of actions initiated by the Gillmors seeking to
obtain expanded use of two mountain trails that traverse property initially owned by
David Richards. The additional defendants in this action are subsequent owners of
portions of the original Richards parcels. This ongoing dispute was also the subject of a
prior court of appeals decision, Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57.
2.

Course of the Proceedings

In 2007, Gillmorfiledher latest lawsuit against defendants, pleading
condemnation and "highway by public use." (R. 1.) Appellees filed a motion to dismiss
the action, arguing that Gillmor's claims were barred by res judicata. The district court
ruledfromthe bench that Gillmor's claims were barred by res judicata. (R. 110 at p. 63
andR. 154.)
Defendants then moved for sanctions under Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) against Gillmor
and her counsel. The district court imposed sanctions against Gillmor's counsel pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), but declined to impose sanctions against Gillmor herself.
(R. 192.)

3.

Disposition in the Court Below.

Gillmor appealed these determinations to the Court of Appeals, and Defendants
cross-appealed the determination that sanctions would not be imposed against Gillmor.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. See Gillmor, 2010 UT App at f 1,224 P.3d at 743.
The Court of Appeals determined that the district court correctly concluded that
Gillmor's claims were barred by res judicata and that Gillmor presented insufficient
evidence to show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11. See id at ^j 21.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contrary to Gillmor's assertion, Appellant's Brief at 4, the Gillmor property is not
landlocked, and the trial judge observed that this claim, first made in a memorandum and
not in the complaint, "appears inconsistent with my Findings of Fact [in the 2001 action,
which was also the subject of the first appeal at 2005 UT App 351]". (R. 195, p. 3; R. 31,
Exhibit 4, Finding #21 ("The court finds that historic routes of access to the Gillmor
property, used either by Gillmor or his invitees, include the following: Perdue Creek
Road, Neil Creek Road, Fraser Hollow, White Creek, Hoytsville (through Spring
Canyon) and maybe 'Sheep Trail'...".)) Gillmor also asserts, without support from the
record, that Family Link has been unwilling to allow Gillmor reasonable access. In fact,
Gillmor has enjoyed the access bargained for and obtained by her husband in the 1985
Easement and Use Agreement. (R. 31, Exhibit 3.)
Gillmor also asserts that this action is the first time that all of the property owners
who own property over which the two trails at issue run have been included in one of her
2

actions. Appellant's Brief at 5. This statement is also undeniably incorrect. In 1984,
Richards owned all of the land now owned by the defendants. (See R. 31, p. 1, f 2, not
disputed by Gillmor in the trial court, see R. 70, p. 2.) Gillmor's statement at page 5 of
her brief that the 2001 action was only against Richards is incorrect. That action also
included the Macey's and Family Link, who at that time were the only other owners of
property over which these mountain trails ran. See Gillmor, 2005 UT App at f 4, 121
P.3d at 62. Gillmor also mischaracterizes the 2005 ruling of the Court of Appeals. While
certain aspects of the Agreement were undeniably personal in nature, Gillmors (and their
successors in interest) obtained an easement that runs with the land for certain
agricultural and hunting purposes as were agreed to by those who owned the property in
1985, when the Easement and Use Agreement was created. Id. at f 23.
The Court of Appeals provides a factual overview in its Opinion, Gillmor, 2010
UT App atffl[2-8, 224 P.3d at 743-45, which more accurately states the facts of this case
than Gillmor does in her Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Gillmor's claims in this action are barred by the claim preclusion branch of res
judicata. In this case, Gillmor actually conceded that the legal and factual theories
asserted in this action could have been asserted in either the 1984 or the 2001 lawsuits
which also involved the use of these trails. The decision not to pursue them earlier was
strategic, and neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals erred in their analysis or
application ofres judicata to this case.
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The Court of Appeals properly determined that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding sanctions against appellant's counsel. Counsel's legal arguments
in opposition to the motion to dismiss on the issue of res judicata were unsupported by
any legal authority. The dissent of a single judge on appeal does not undermine the
decision of the majority of the Court of Appeals that there was no abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I.

GILLMOR FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION
THAT GILLMOR'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
Gillmor argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's

determination that her claims were barred by res judicata. However, Gillmor fails to
address the Court of Appeals' reasoning or its decision. Instead, Gillmor merely cites to
the dissenting opinion published by Judge Thorne, and argues that reversal is appropriate
for the reasons stated therein. This analysis is inadequate and fails to provide any basis to
determine that the Court of Appeals erred.
On a writ of certiorari, it is the decision of the Court of Appeals that is under
review. "Therefore, the briefs of the parties should address the decision of the court of
appeals.. .." Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992); see also Griffith v.
Griffith, 1999 UT 78, f 17, 935 P.2d 255. Gillmor fails to address the Court of Appeals'
Opinion, let alone describe why she believes that decision was flawed. Consequently,
she has failed to show any error committed by the Court of Appeals.
In any event, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Gillmor's claims
were barred by the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion is
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premised on the principle that a controversy should only be adjudicated once." Mack v.
Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f 29,221 P.3d 194 (quotations and citations
omitted). Whether a claim is precluded from relitigation depends on a three-part test:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must
have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and
should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. (citations omitted). Here, only the second requirement is at issue, to wit, whether the
claims asserted by Gillmor could and should have been raised in one of her two previous
actions. See Gillmor, 2010 UT App at ^ 11, 224 P.3d at 745-46. This requirement was
discussed in detail in Mack:
Claims or causes of action are the same as those brought or
that could have been brought in the first action if they arise
from the same operative facts, or in other words from the
same transaction. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §
24 (1982). Previously we have held that two causes of action
are the same if they rest on the same "state of facts," and the
evidence "necessary to sustain the two causes of action" is of
the same kind or character. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,
1340 (Utah 1983). More recently, however, we have moved
toward the transactional theory of claim preclusion espoused
by the Restatement (Second). For example, in Burnett v.
Utah Power & Light Co., we noted that "frjather than resting
on the specific legal theory invoked, res judicata generally is
thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying
events giving rise to the various legal claims." 797 P.2d 1096,
1098 (Utah 1990) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688
F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir.1982) (en banc)). See also Swainston
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061
(Utah 1988) ("A claim or cause of action is 'the aggregate of
operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the
courts.' " (quoting Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre,
133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.1943)).
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Mack., 2009 UT at f 30, 221 P.3d at 203 (emphasis added); see also Swainston v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988) ("A claim is the
situation or state of facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the
right to seek judicial interference.").
Thus, claim preclusion "reflects the expectation that parties who are given the
capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so." Am. Estate Mgmt.
Corp. v. Int'l. Inv. andDev. Corp., 1999 UT App 232, f 12, 986 P.2d 765 (quoting
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. a (1982)). "If a party fails, purposely or
negligently, to make good his cause of action...by all proper means within his control,...
he will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, nor to
relitigate the same matters between the same parties." Id. (quotations and citations
omitted). For instance, in the case of Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp., a party filed suit claiming
an ownership interest in a parking lot pursuant to a written agreement. When that claim
failed, the same party filed another suit claiming an ownership interest in that same
parking lot via a claim of adverse possession. Id. atfflf4-5. Noting that both actions
asserted one claim under ;ctwo different legal theories," and that the adverse possession
theory was available during the course of the first lawsuit, the Court of Appeals held that
the second action was barred by claim preclusion:
the only reason AEM's claim of adverse possession was not
decided in the prior action is because AEM failed to raise it
. . . the claim preclusion branch of res judicata bars AEM
from doing so now.
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Id. at f 14 (citing Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Utah 1962) ("Here, we
have the same parties litigating the same subject matter-an asserted right of way over
defendants* property.... [T]he issue or theory of implied easement, now urged in this
second action, could have been urged and adjudicated in the first action."); Irving Pulp &
Paper Ltd. v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 418 (Me. 1995) (Adverse possession was "an issue
that might have been tried in the 1951 action. Under the doctrine of res judicata,
[appellee] and his privies are therefore precludedfromhaving or claiming any right or
title adverse to [appellant] for any period prior to November 1951."); Bagley v. Moxley,
555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Mass 1990) ("[P]laintiffs were not entitled to pursue their claim of
ownership through piecemeal litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while
holding others in reserve for future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful.").
The Court of Appeals correctly applied this analysis to the instant case. Analysis
of the district court's ruling began with the fact that, in 1984, Gillmor first brought suit
against Appellee Richards, seeking a prescriptive easement or irrevocable license in an
attempt to access Gillmor's property by way of these same two private roads. Gillmor,
2010 UT App at % 2, 224 P.3d at 743. Gillmorfiledsuit again in 2001 "against the
subsequent owners of the Richards property, seeking a declaration of her rights under the
easement agreement. [This second suit] concerned the "authorized use of the roads to
access the Gillmor property under the easement agreement." Id. at *| 3, 224 P.3d at 744.
Gillmor filed the present suit against Appellees in 2007, "pleading condemnation and
;

highway-by-public-use,' again seeking a determination regarding use of the roads over

the Richards property to access the Gillmor property." Id. at f 4,224 P.3d at 744. The
7

Court of Appeals noted that "Mr. Baird conceded that the legal theories alleged here
could have been brought in either the 1984 or 2001 suits," and that "Mr. Baird also
speculated that these theories were omitted from earlier suits for strategic purposes,
stating that simultaneously bringing a claim for a public and private right of access
'would have been pretty dicey.'" Id. at ^ 6, 224 P.3d at 744. See also Dec. 19, 2007
Motion Hearing Transcript, R. 110, p. 28 (Mr. Baird concedes that "nothing has
happened between '85 and 2007 that has changed the status of whether it has become a
public road.").
Given the undisputed facts and argument presented below, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the district court properly determined that Gillmor's latest claims were barred
by res judicata. The Court of Appeals noted that, while Gillmor has come up with new
theories of recovery, "these theories could and should have been raised in either the 1984
or 2001 suits. Id. at % 13, 224 P.3d at 746 (citing Mack, 2009 UT at f 29, 221 P.3d at
203). Gillmor, in fact, "conceded that the legal theories at issue here were legally and
factually available " before her first suit. Id. "All three suits have had an identical
motivation calculated to obtain a common goal: use of roads over the Richards property
in order to more easily access the Gillmor property." Id. It was also undisputed that a
"claim based on publicrightsmay have been intentionally ignored or strategically
sacrificed in favor of asserting a private right." Id. at ^ 14, 224 p.3D AT 747. The Court
of Appeals therefore properly determined, under Mack and Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp., that
each lawsuit asserted the same "claim" for purposes ofres judicata:

8

This is not only a strategic decision on how to present the
claim, but it is also a choice as to the desired objective of the
litigation. Whether "purposely or negligently," the Gillmors
failed to assert all available theories supporting their claim
"by all proper means within [their] control." See American,
1999 UT App 232, \ 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
They cannot "be permitted to ... relitigate the same matters
between the same parties." See id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Nor may they now "pursue their claim ... through
piecemeal litigation, [having offered] one legal theory to the
court while holding others in reserve for future litigation,"
which are now being asserted because the first two suits have
"provefn] unsuccessful." See id. ^ 14. Mrs. Gillmor cannot
now be allowed yet another "attempt at substantially the same
objective under a different guise." See Wheadon v. Pearson,
14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946, 948 (1962). Accordingly, the
district court correctly concluded that Mrs. Gillmor's claims
are barred by res judicata.
Id.
On certiorari, Gillmor fails to challenge the basis for this determination. Instead,
she simply points to the dissenting opinion filed by Judge Thome and argues that this
analysis was correct. However, the dissent does not apply the proper "transactional
theory of claim preclusion" adopted by this Court in Mack. The dissent focused on the
fact that the latest theories asserted by Gillmor contain different elements and require
different factual determinations. See id. at % 27, 224 P.3d at 749. This approach was
specifically rejected by this Court in Mack:
Previously we have held that two causes of action are the
same if they rest on the same "state of facts," and the
evidence "necessary to sustain the two causes of action" is of
the same kind or character. Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,
1340 (Utah 1983). More recently, however, we have moved
toward the transactional theory of claim preclusion espoused
by the Restatement (Second). For example, in Burnett v.
Utah Power & Light Co., we noted that "[rjather than resting
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on the specific legal theory invoked, res judicata generally is
thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying
events giving rise to the various legal claims."
Mack, 2009 UT at % 30, 221 P.3d at 203. As the majority in the Court of appeals noted,
the underlying events giving rise to each of the lawsuits filed by Gillmor were the same Gillmor wanted access to her land via defendants' property.1 Thus, proper analysis under
Mack leads to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.2
Moreover, the additional cases cited by Gillmor do nothing to show that the Court
of Appeals erred in its analysis or application of res judicata in this case. In Schaer v.
State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), this Court recognized the broader rule that res judicata
"...precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those
that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action..." Id. at 1340 (citation omitted). Schaer
involved a fairly unusual series of events. In 1967, a part of the plaintiffs property was
taken by the State of Utah by condemnation for use as a highway. In the 1967 case, the
trial court observed that Schaer was entitled to severance damages because the taking left

Even under the older approach, there is a substantial overlap in the evidence that
might be offered between the 1985 action for a prescriptive easement and the current
claim for "highway-by-public-use." Evidence of Gillmor's open and notorious use would
also be evidence of travel by the public.
The dissent also raises the concern that claim preclusion would in some way
prevent "all members of the public from bringing a public claim..." Gillmor, 2010 UT
App at ^ 26,224 P.3d at 749. However, that concern is ameliorated by the fact that claim
preclusion only arises if the parties to each lawsuit are the same. Mack, 2009 UT at f 29,
221 P.3d at 203. In this case, and in this appeal, only the rights of Gillmor can be and are
being adjudicated. In addition, this argument was first advanced by Gillmor at the
hearing before the Court of Appeals, and was not raised or preserved in the trial court (
R. 110).
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him effectively landlocked. In 1979, the State was a defendant in an inverse
condemnation action brought by an adjoining property owner, who sought a
determination that a dugway that passed through the adjoining property was a public
thoroughfare. That case was settled without a ruling on the public thoroughfare claim. In
Schaer, which was then the third case, Schaer sought a determination that the dugway
was a public thoroughfare. The State intervened, and argued that Schaer was precluded
from making this argument because of the finding in the 1967 case that his property was
effectively landlocked. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court properly rejected the
argument that res judicata applied. The 1967 action was not about the dugway, but was
about the value of Shaer's property being taken by the State. The second action by
Schaer did not involve condemnation, but was solely about the use of the dugway.
The present case is distinguishable from Schaer because the two causes of action
raised in this case involve Gillmor's use of the roads, and could have been asserted in the
1984 and 2001 actions, where the claims involved, again, Gillmor's right to use the roads.
Also unlike Schaer, all of the events concerning the nature and use of the roads giving
rise to Gillmor's claims in the 2007 action occurred before the first action was brought.
The application of Schaer that Gillmor argues for (a) ignores the plain language of the
rule announced in Schaer (that res judicata precludes relitigation of issues that could
have been litigated) and (b) would result in endless litigation between parties because
there would be no requirement that a complaining party bring all of their claims against
an adversary in a single proceeding. In all three cases, the 1984 case, the 2001 case, and
the 2007 action, Gillmor sought the same result, i.e., broader, if not unbridled use of the
11

Perdue and Neil Creek roads over defendants' property. Moreover, it should be noted
that the approach taken in Schaer was specifically rejected by this Court in Mack. See
Mack, 2009 UT at \ 30, 221 P.3d at 203.
Gillmor next relies on Comm 'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), an appeal from the
tax court. In Sunnen, the Supreme Court concluded that where similar cases may involve
different tax years, and different tax laws, the law of collateral estoppel must be carefully
applied. Id. at 599-600. The Supreme Court went on to conclude, based upon factors
unique to tax courts, that the tax payer was not bound by a prior determination of tax
liability based on prior years' returns. In the course of the decision, the Supreme Court
recognized that res judicata applies "'not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose.'" Id. at 597 (citation omitted, emphasis
added). Thus, Sunnen is both readily distinguishable by its unique facts, and supportive
of defendants' position through the Court's own recognition of the principle advanced by
defendants in this action, i.e., that if Gillmor had claims related to her use of the roads
that could have been asserted in 2001, she was obligated to raise them in 2001.
The next case relied on by Gillmor, Hill v. Seattle First Nat'I Bank, 827 P.2d 241
(Utah 1992), also presents a unique fact situation. Hill had been involved in a federal
court action against Citizens Bank of Ogden. Citizens had failed and been taken over by
the FDIC. Seattle First was never served and did not participate in the federal action.
Because of the FDIC's involvement, certain claims against Citizen's Bank were barred
by federal law. See id. at 243. By law, Hill could only pursue claims based on written
12

agreements against the FDIC, and as a consequence its claim that an oral agreement
existed could not be pursued. After the federal court made its ruling, Hill brought the
same claims against Seattle First (who was a participant in the loan that precipitated the
federal action). Seattle First argued that res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Hill's
claims against it. The trial court concluded that collateral estoppel barred Hill from
pursuing its claims in the second action based on the alleged oral agreement. The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed. The decision does not address in any meaningful way any of
the issues related to res judicata that exist in this case.
In short, none of the cases cited by Gillmor undermine the fact that the "claim"
asserted in this action (Gillmor's right to use the roads) is the same claim that has been
pursued in the two earlier actions, under different disguises. To be certain, none of the
cases show that the Court of Appeals erred in this case by affirming the district court's
determination that res judicata applied to bar Gillmor's latest reiteration of her claims.
Last, Gillmor raises an issue regarding a "change in the law." In her arguments on
this subject in lower courts, Gillmor has never explained how any "change in the law"
might impact her claims, and thus, ignores the fact that any argument that it does impact
her claims was not raised in the district court and was not addressed before the Court of
Appeals. "Issues not raised at trial are usually deemed waived and cannot be argued for
the first time on appeal." DougJessop Const, Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, *f 18,
195 P.3d 493 (citation omitted).
This argument also fails on the merits. The change in the law exception to res
judicata has limited application. To invoke this exception, "a party must establish that a
13

new substantive right has been created. Whether a new substantive right has been created
by a judicial opinion issued after the party's original suit has been decided, however,
requires, at a minimum, an actual change in the law." Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of
Adjustment, 2000 UT App 371, % 14, 16 P.3d 1251. Gillmor claims that this Court
changed the "highway-by-use law" in Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10,179
P.3d 768. Appellant's Brief at 16. Contrary to Gillmor's argument, the Okelberry
decision did not change the law, but clarified it. Okelberry, 2008 UT at f 15, 179 P.3d at
774. See also Tirozzi v. Shelby Ins. Co., 719 A.2d 62, 66 (Conn. App. 1998) ("[N]either
this court nor our Supreme Court has recognized an exception to res judicata for
situations where there is a change in the law by clarification."); cf. State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 546 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("An amendment which, in effect, construes and
clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act"
and thus indicates "a legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather
than to change the law." (citations omitted)).
In Okelberry, the Supreme Court sought to articulate a standardized definition for
the phrase "continuously used" set forth by the legislature, but not defined, in Utah Code
Ann. Section 72-5-104(1) (2001 & 2008) (the "Dedication Statute").3 See Okelberry,
2008 UT at 1fl[ 12-13, 179 P.3d at 773-74. The Supreme Court observed:
The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely from
the fact that we have never set forth a standard for
3

The Dedication Statute provides: "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the
use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period
often years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001 & 2008).
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determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to
restart the running of the required ten-year period under the
Dedication Statute. We do so now by setting forth a brightline rule by which we intend to make application of the
Dedication Statute more predictable:
An overt act that is intended by a property
owner to interrupt the use of a road as a public
thoroughfare, and is reasonably calculated to do
so, constitutes an interruption sufficient to
restart the running of the required ten-year
period under the Dedication Statute.
This rule does not change the burden of the party claiming
dedication. For a highway to be deemed dedicated to the
public, the party claiming dedication must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the road at issue was
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years
Id. at TI15, 179 P.3d at 774. Thus, the Supreme Court did not change the Dedication
Statute in Okelberry, it only clarified it to make it more predictable. Indeed, the Supreme
Court cannot change the language of a statute by judicial decision without violating the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. See Utah Const. Art. V, ^f 1; accord
Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1976) ("a constitutional or legislative
change should comefromthe sovereign: the people" and observing "there is a definite
distinction between a change in interpretation or application of a statute, which
sometimes quite justifiably occurs, and attempting by judicial fiat to affect a substantial
change in law as clearly expressed in a statute or the constitution.").
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While the Supreme Court, on certiorari, rejected the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of "continuously used" in the Dedication Statute,4 see Okelberry, 2008 UT
at f 12, 179 P.3d AT 773, this does not constitute a change in the law. See Collins, 2002
UT at T| 15, 16 P.3d at 1270 (observing there was no change in the law simply because the
district court's interpretation of the law was rejected on appeal); Federated Dep't Stores,
Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("The res judicata consequences of a final,
unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may
have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.").
Finally, Gillmor argues that the Court of Appeal's decision in the 2001 case
"created . . . an altered situation" for Gillmor. Appellant's Brief at 16. In effect,
Gillmor's argument is that because she failed to anticipate that she might not prevail in
the 2001 action, an "altered situation" has arisen. This type of argument falls squarely
within the warning of the United States Supreme Court in Federated Dep't Stores, 452
U.S. at 398, that efforts to craft equitable exceptions to res judicata create opportunities
for mischief, and should be avoided. Similarly, the fact that the 2001 action resulted in
limitations consistent with the 1985 Agreement that Gillmor claims she did not anticipate
does not change the fact that core claim in the 2001 action revolved around Gillmor's
rights to use these mountain trails, the very claim presented in this action under a new
theory. For this reason, Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 142 P.3d 594 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) has no
application here.
4

The Court of Appeals decision appears at Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006
UT App 473, 153P.3d745.
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II.

GILLMOR FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION
THAT RULE 11 SANCTIONS WERE APPROPRIATE.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that sanctions

under Rule 11(b)(2) were appropriate in this case, holding that it "cannot say that the
district court abused its considerable discretion in imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird
for violating rule 11(b)(2)." Gillmor, 2010 UT App at If 18, 224 P.3d at 748. Gillmor
asks this Court to reverse this determination based solely on the fact that there was a
dissenting opinion. This argument is insufficient to warrant reversal.
Gillmor fails to show that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was
no abuse of discretion. Gillmor ignores both the standard of review and the reasoning
behind the Court of Appeals' ruling. Instead, Gillmor's argument is as follows: "If a
Judge on the Utah Court of Appeals agrees with the position of Gillmor's counsels, then
how can that position be so unreasonable as to warrant sanctions under Rule 11...?"
Appellant's Brief at 18. Gillmor fails to address the relevant question - how or why she
believes the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the district court did not
abuse its discretion. See Griffith, 1999 UT at If 17, 985 P.2d at 260.
The Court of Appeals began with the analysis that the "district court's
determination that Mr. Baird had violated rule 11(b)(2) was premised upon the court's
conclusion that [Gillmor's] claims were barred by res judicata....

In view of our

conclusion that [Gillmor's] claims are barred by res judicata, the appropriate standard of
review is whether the district court's decision to impose sanctions was an abuse of
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discretion." Gillmor, 2010 UT App at \ 16, 224 P.3d at 748. Gillmor does not challenge
this ruling.
In its review of the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals noted that the
district court wrote that it was '"at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought
the present action without violating rule 11(b)(2)'" because Gillmor had failed to identify
any exception to application of the bar of res judicata. Id. at \ 17, 224 P.3d at 748. The
Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion with this analysis. The issue of central
importance was not, as Gillmor argued to the Court of Appeals and again to this Court,
whether Mr. Baird's take on the law was inaccurate - it was the fact that his arguments in
support of applying an exception to res judicata were entirely unsupported:
Mr. Baird argues that "the mere fact that [his] view of the law
was wrong cannot support a finding of a rule 11 violation."
However, it is not that Mr. Baird's arguments below were
wrong but that those arguments were not supported by any
legal authority-especially given the fact that Mr. Baird had
anticipated the res judicata issue before filing this suit. In
light of the filing of a claim barred by res judicata and the
absence of any legal authority in support of Mr. Baird's
arguments below concerning exceptions to res judicata, we
cannot say that the district court abused its considerable
discretion in imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird for
violating rule 11(b)(2).
Id. at \ 18, 224 P.3d at 748 (emphasis added).
The only issue before this Court is "whether the court of appeals erred in finding
no abuse of discretion." Griffith, 1999 UT at \ 17, 985 P.2d at 260. Gillmor provides no
analysis of this issue. Gillmor does not even address the actual holding of the Court of
Appeals. Instead, Gillmor relies entirely on the dissenting opinion and asserts that the
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majority erred by not following the reasoning of Judge Thome. See Appellant's Brief at
18-19. Accordingly, Gillmor makes no showing that the Court of Appeals or the trial
court abused its discretion.
To the contrary, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion.
Numerous courts throughout the country, including Utah, have held that proceeding with
a lawsuit despite the fact that such claims were barred by res judicata is sufficient to
justify Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Schoney v. Mem'I Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)5; Cannon v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 784 F.2d 777, 782 (7th Cir.
1986); King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219,223 (8th Cir. 1991); Paganucci v. City
of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Nothwang v. Payless Drug Stores
NW, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 675, 676 (D. Or. 1991); Estate of Blue v. County of Los Angeles,
120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Fla. Health Sci. Ctr., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13006 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
In addition, the basis for the Court of Appeals decision to affirm was not simply
that res judicata applied, but that Mr. Baird, anticipating that it would apply, provided no
authority whatsoever to the district court that Gillmor was entitled to an exception from
its application. Gillmor, 2010 UT App atffl[17-18, 224 P.3d at 748. Gillmor does not
address this problem in her appeal brief6 while the record makes clear that Gillmor failed

5

Gillmor's assertion that "no Utah Court has held that pursuing an action that is
later found to be barred by res judicata is improper for the purpose of the imposition of
rule 11 sanctions" is, without question, incorrect. See Schoney, 863 P.2d at 62.
6

Indeed, Gillmor ignores the actual ruling made by the Court of Appeals. Gillmor
states in her brief that "the District Court determined that because res judicata applied,
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to raise any applicable exception in her memorandum opposing Appellees' motion to
dismiss {see R. 70) or during the course of oral argument on the motion to dismiss {see
R. 110). Accordingly, the record supports the Court of Appeals' determination that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed Rule 11 sanctions.
Last, Gillmor's position on this point must be rejected for a common sense reason.
Gillmor argues that reversal must automatically follow any time there is a dissenting
opinion on a Rule 11 determination. Gillmor is unable to cite any legal authority for this
assertion, perhaps because it defies logic. This claim would render a majority opinion
obsolete, as every decision regarding application of Rule 11 sanctions would depend
entirely on whether there was or was not a dissenting opinion.
CONCLUSION
Gillmor has failed to set forth any reason to disturb the Opinion of the Court of
Appeals. No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it affirmed the district
court's rulings regarding res judicata and Rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, defendants
respectfully submit that the Opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals should be affirmed
and that defendants should be awarded their costs and the matter be remanded for
consideration of additional sanctions.

that sanctions must follow, and the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court."
Appellant's Brief at 21. As set forth above, this was not the ruling of either the district
court or the Court of Appeals.
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